Texas Legislature Hammers Out Massive Tort Reform Bill

By PATRICE PUJOL and MARTY THOMPSON

After pressure from Governor Rick Perry and lobbyists from the medical community, the 78th Texas Legislature passed a massive tort reform bill that largely rewrites the way lawsuits– particularly medical malpractice suits– are prosecuted in this state.1 Known as House Bill 4, this new legislation also overhauls the proportionate responsibility statutes, implements a new “settlement offer” procedure, and restricts the liability of certain non-manufacturing sellers and successor entities.2 The following article outlines the most significant portions of H.B. 4 and discusses the practical impact that these new statutes will have on the practice of law.

CLASS ACTIONS
In the area of class actions, H.B. 4 provides relief for state agencies facing a certification hearing and slightly expands the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. These provisions now require a trial court specifically to consider and rule on the availability of administrative relief before certifying a class. They also provide prompt appellate review of that ruling.
Before hearing or deciding a motion to certify a class, the trial court must hear and decide a plea to the jurisdiction asserting the dominant jurisdiction of a state agency, or that the plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.3 If the court denies the plea to the jurisdiction and certifies a class, the party wishing to appeal the certification may also appeal the denial of the jurisdictional plea.4 Nevertheless, this new provision does not affect a party’s right to seek mandamus relief as to the trial court’s decision on the jurisdictional plea.5 The provisions apply to any case filed on or after September 1, 2003.6
In addition, interlocutory appellate relief has been expanded. The Government Code now permits an interlocutory petition for review of a certification decision to the Texas Supreme Court, without the necessity of another ground for jurisdiction.7 The Supreme Court’s “conflict jurisdiction” has been slightly expanded to include conflicting appellate decisions whose inconsistency “should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants.”8 The provisions apply to any case in which a petition for review is filed on or after September 1, 2003.9
Appellants also enjoy a stay of the proceedings pending their interlocutory appeal. Specifically, the stay available for certain appeals has been broadened to include “all other proceedings,” not just trial.10 This expanded stay applies to the interlocutory appeal of orders certifying or refusing to certify a class, denying summary judgment based on the immunity of an officer or employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state, and granting or denying a governmental unit’s plea to the jurisdiction.11 The expanded stay should prevent potentially expensive discovery, particularly in class actions, that may moot the issues on appeal. This provision applies to any case in which a notice of appeal is filed on or after September 1, 2003.12

OFFERS OF SETTLEMENT
Applying only to claims for monetary relief, the new “settlement procedure” allows parties to negotiate a settlement of their case with the added incentive – or threat – of litigation costs.13 The procedure may be used only if it is invoked by a defendant who files a proper, written declaration containing the settlement offer.14 But the procedure is a double-edged sword: once invoked, the plaintiff may also use the procedure to make her own offers to the defendant and potentially recover her litigation costs.15
“Litigation costs” is money actually spent and debts actually incurred that are directly related to the case.16 The costs include court costs, the reasonable fees for two or fewer testifying experts, and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred after the date on which the offer is rejected.17 If the judgment rendered is significantly less favorable to the party who re-
jected an offer, then the offering party will recover her litigation costs.18 “Significantly less favorable” is defined in terms of percentages of the judgment awarded. If the jury awards the plaintiff less than 80 percent of the offer she rejected, then the offering defendant may recover his litigation costs.19 On the other hand, if the jury awards the plaintiff more than 120 percent of the offer she made to the defendant who rejected it, then the plaintiff may recover her litigation costs.20
However, these litigation costs are carefully limited. First, they may not exceed the sum of (a) 50 percent of the economic damages, plus (b) 100 percent of the noneconomic damages, plus (c) 100 percent of the punitive damages, minus (d) the total of any liens connected with the underlying claim.21 This will ensure that the plaintiff receives at least half of her economic damages, and that any liens are paid first. Moreover, if a party is entitled to fees and costs under another statute, that party cannot recover litigation costs in addition to the statutory fees and costs; these other statutory fees and costs are not included in the judgment amount when determining whether the judgment is “significantly less favorable” than the rejected offer.22 Finally, if litigation costs are assessed against a plaintiff, then those costs will be included in the judgment as an offset to the plaintiff’s recovery.23
These provisions apply to actions filed on or after January 1, 2004.24

VENUE
“Good for one plaintiff, good for all plaintiffs” has been abolished.25 In multiple plaintiff cases, whether filed as such or created by joinder, intervention or otherwise, each plaintiff must establish proper venue independently of all other plaintiffs.26 If a plaintiff cannot establish proper venue, then she must be transferred or dismissed unless she can establish that (a) her presence is otherwise procedurally proper, (b) there is no unfair prejudice to any other party, (c) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s claim tried in the county where the suit is pending, and (d) the county is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff and all defendants.27
In addition, venue under section 15.007 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code is mandatory in an action by or against a personal representative for personal injury, death, or property damage.28 This provision trumps the venue and transfer provisions in the Probate Code.29 It is intended to prevent plaintiffs from manufacturing venue through the creation of trusts or by using the probate court venue rules to forum shop.
These provisions apply to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.30

FORUM NON CONVENIENS
The trial court no longer has discretion to retain and proceed with an action that should be in another jurisdiction on forum non conveniens grounds. If a trial court determines in the interest of justice and the convenience of the parties that there is a more appropriate or convenient forum for a suit other than where it is filed, the court must decline to exercise jurisdiction, and stay or dismiss the action.31 When making this determination, the trial court will apply the discretionary standards previously applied under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 71.051(b).32 The forum non conveniens provisions for aliens and asbestos actions under sections 71.051(a) and 71.052 are repealed.33 These provisions apply to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.34

MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION
Texas now follows the federal multi-district litigation (“MDL”) process in certain state proceedings.35 The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court will appoint an MDL judicial panel consisting of five appellate judges.36 The panel will have the power to transfer cases involving common questions of fact to any district court for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, including summary judgment and other dispositive motions.37 Such transfers will be made if the panel determines that the transfer will be convenient for the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of actions.38 Afterwards, the transferred cases will be remanded back to their original courts for trial.39 Use of the MDL process is expected to aid substantially in dealing with competing cases and avoid potentially inconsistent rulings. The provisions apply to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.40

PROPORTIONATE LIABILITY
The new proportionate liability scheme has overhauled Chapter 33 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. These new provisions represent a massive change in Texas tort law and should lead to much fairer apportionment of fault and, thus, fewer instances of imposing joint and several liability on deep-pocketed defendants with little culpability.
The centerpiece of new Chapter 33 is the “designation” of a responsible third party (“RTP”).41 Joining an RTP is no longer required; now, the RTP need only be “designated.”42 An RTP is anyone who allegedly contributed in any way to the harm claimed by the plaintiff.43 The designation may now include employers, bankrupts and unknown “John Does” whose actions contributed to the harm.44 Moreover, the trial court need not determine whether it can exercise jurisdiction over the RTP.45 Specifically excluded from being RTPs are “innocent sellers” eligible for indemnity under section 82.002.46
The defendant must move to designate the RTP at least 60 days before trial, absent good cause.47 After adequate time for discovery, a claimant may move to strike a designation on “no evidence” grounds.48 If he objects, the defendant has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact.49 Because no actual liability attaches, the designation has no practical effect on third parties, but serves only to allow the jury fairly to assess the fault of everyone involved and determine every person’s culpability.50 These provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2003.51

JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
A defendant is jointly and severally liable if his percentage of fault is greater than 50 percent or he acted with specific intent to violate certain provisions of the Texas Penal Code.52 The 15 percent threshold for toxic torts is repealed.53 Accordingly, for purposes of joint and several liability, toxic tort claims are treated exactly like all other claims involving multiple defendants. These provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2003.54

SETTLEMENT CREDITS
The trial court should reduce the amount of damages by a percentage equal to each settling party’s percentage of responsibility.55 The sliding scale scheme and election for settlement credits under former sections 33.012 and 33.014 are now abolished.56 In health care liability claims, however, the defendants may elect the dollar amount of all settlements or, alternatively, the percentage of fault assessed against all settling defendants.57 If the election is not unanimous among the defendants, then the credit will be based on the dollar amount of settlements.58 These provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2003.59

PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The new products liability provisions are intended to be very broad in reach and apply to products liability cases regardless of the legal theory pleaded. The definition of “products liability action” has been expanded to include economic losses and declaratory, injunctive or other equitable relief.60
The new products liability provisions also institute a new 15-year statute of repose that applies to claims against manufacturers and sellers. It specifically excludes latent exposure claims involving personal injury or wrongful death in which the plaintiff alleges that (a) he was exposed to the product within 15 years of the date that the product was first sold, (b) his exposure to the product caused the disease made the basis of the suit, and (c) the 15-year period elapsed before the plaintiff’s symptoms manifested sufficiently to put him on notice of injury.61 Like the former statute, this repose period does not affect applicable statutes of limitation and does not apply to leased products.62 However, the repose statute excludes all claims involving the Aviation Revitalization Act or its exceptions.63
In addition, as a new general rule, non-manufacturing sellers are not liable for the harm caused by a product they sell.64 However, the general rule does not apply if the seller did one of the following acts causing the alleged harm: (a) participated in the product’s design; (b) installed or assembled the product; (c) exercised substantial control over the product’s inadequate warning; (d) made an express fact representation that was incorrect and relied on by the plaintiff, and that would have avoided or mitigated the harm if the representation were true; or (e) actually knew about the defect at time of sale and the defect caused the plaintiff’s harm, or if the manufacturer is insolvent or not subject to the trial court’s jurisdiction.65 This new law largely codifies existing law but emphasizes that the alleged action or inaction by the seller must be causally related to the specific defect that caused the harm.
The new provisions also address claims asserting the inadequacy of pharmaceutical warnings. Defendants are now protected by a rebuttable presumption: if the warnings were approved by the FDA, or if the warnings were stated in monographs produced by the FDA for products not requiring approval, then the warnings are presumed adequate.66 However, a plaintiff may rebut this presumption by showing that: (a) the defendant withheld or misrepresented material information relevant to product performance causally related to the injury; (b) the product was sold after the FDA withdrew its approval or ordered the product withdrawn from the market; (c) the defendant promoted or prescribed the product for an indication without FDA approval and that resulted in the injury; or (d) the defendant bribed public officials before and after the FDA’s pre-market approval and that conduct caused the warnings to be inadequate.67
Finally, the new products liability codifies a government standards defense providing two rebuttable presumptions of non-liability for manufacturers and sellers. First, a manufacturer or seller is not liable for the formulation, labeling or design of a product if the manufacturer or seller establishes that the product’s formula, label or design complied with mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and that governed the risk that allegedly caused the plaintiff’s harm.68 A plaintiff may rebut this presumption by establishing that the mandatory federal safety standards or regulations were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risks of injury or damage.69 Alternatively, the plaintiff may rebut the presumption by establishing that before or after marketing the product, the manufacturer withheld or misrepresented information that was material and relevant to the government’s or agency’s determination of the adequacy of the safety standards or regulations at issue.70
The second rebuttable presumption requires three elements of proof. Essentially, a manufacturer or seller is not liable for the formulation, labeling or design of a product if the manufacturer or seller establishes that (a) the product was subject to pre-market licensing or approval by the federal government or an agency; (b) the manufacturer complied with all of the pre-market licensing or approval procedures and requirements; and (c) the product was approved or licensed for sale.71 A plaintiff may rebut this presumption by establishing that the pre-market approval or licensing process was inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risk of injury or damage.72 Alternatively, the plaintiff may rebut this presumption by establishing that before or after pre-market approval or licensing, the manufacturer withheld or misrepresented information that was material and relevant to the performance of the product and causally related to the plaintiff’s injury.73 These presumptions do not apply to manufacturing flaws or defects even though a manufacturer complied with all federal quality control and manufacturing processes.74 Finally, these presumptions do not apply to pharmaceutical products governed by new section 82.007.75
These new provisions apply to actions filed on or after July 1, 2003.76

EXECUTION ON FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
New provisions now defeat the rush to execute on judgments in Texas where the time for appeal has not run in the issuing state. The execution of a foreign judgment is stayed if an appeal is pending, the time to appeal has not expired, or a stay has been granted or requested in the state where the judgment was entered, and the debtor has furnished or will furnish security required by that state.77 Alternatively, the execution of a foreign judgment is stayed if the debtor shows that the judgment would be stayed by Texas courts and provides a proper appeal bond.78 These provisions apply to judgments filed in Texas on or after September 1, 2003.79

SUPERSEDEAS BONDS
Taking a page from the bond problems seen in Texaco v. Pennzoil, the legislature has enacted new statutes modifying the amount needed to supersede a judgment. The new laws prevent a situation where the bond amount alone makes the appeal impossible. Specifically, the bond amount is the sum of compensatory damages, interest for the estimated duration of the appeal and the costs awarded.80 A bond amount is capped: it cannot exceed the lesser of 50 percent of the debtor’s net worth, or $25 million.81 In addition, the trial court may reduce the bond amount below these caps to avoid causing substantial economic harm to the debtor.82 And although the bond amount is subject to appellate review, an appeals court cannot exceed the caps.83 These provisions apply to final judgments signed on or after September 1, 2003.84

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Comprising more than half of the text of H.B. 4, the new medical malpractice provisions completely overhaul health care malpractice procedures. The bill repeals article 4590i of the Texas Civil Statutes and replaces the old statutes with a new and much longer Chapter 74 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.85
The pièce de résistance of the bill is the legislation capping non-economic and punitive damages. The limits on non-economic damages vary depending on whether the defendant is a physician, health care provider or health care institution. The limit for non-economic damages against one or more physicians and/or one or more health care providers is $250,000 per claimant.86 Similarly, the limit for non-economic damages against one health care institution is $250,000 per claimant.87 However, if a judgment is taken against more than one health care institution, then the limit for non-economic damages for each health care institution is $250,000 per claimant and $500,000 for all health care institutions in the case.88 These caps are not adjusted for inflation.
If these caps are found unconstitutional, then the new legislation provides a scheme of alternative caps. These alternative caps increase over time and are linked to certain insurance requirements. First, the same caps set forth above apply to physicians and health care providers who carry insurance covering malpractice claims.89 For a physician in a residency program, the above caps apply if she or it carries insurance of at least $100,000 for each claim and at least $300,000 for all claims in a policy period.90 For a physician or health care provider, the above caps apply if she carries insurance of at least $200,000 for each claim and at least $600,000 for all claims in a policy period.91 Finally, for a health care institution, the above caps apply if it carries insurance of at least $500,000 for each claim and at least $1.5 million for all claims in a policy period.92 These insurance parameters are effective from September 1, 2003 through August 31, 2005.93 Starting September 1, 2005, the insurance requirements increase as follows: for physicians and health care providers, $300,000/$900,000; and for a health care institution, $750,000/$2.25 million.94 Finally, beginning September 1, 2007, the insurance requirements will increase as follows: for physicians and health care providers, $500,000/$1 million; and for a health care institution, $1 million/$3 million.95 The insurance parameters for residents remain the same.96
The new legislation also restores the cap on damages for wrongful death and survival claims. Specifically, all damages — including punitive damages but excluding past and future medical expenses — for a claimant in a wrongful death or survival claim based on medical malpractice are capped at $500,000.97 This cap, however, is indexed for inflation as of August 29, 1977.98 Thus, the cap is about $1.4 million today.
Additionally, the new laws allow future damages other than medical expenses to be paid on a periodic basis. Specifically, future damages in excess of $100,000 may be made by periodic payments instead of in a lump sum.99 The trial court is not required to order periodic payments, but if it does it must require a defendant to show proof of sufficient insurance coverage or post a security bond to ensure that the future payments will be made.100 The judgment should specify how and when the periodic payments are to be made.101
The provisions carry forward the two-year statute of limitations.102 The laws further require that minors under the age of 12 years will have until their 14th birthday to file, or have filed on their behalf, a medical malpractice claim.103 Additionally, the new provisions provide a 10-year statute of repose.104 Specifically, a plaintiff must file a medical malpractice claim within ten years after the date of the act or omission giving rise to the claim.105 If he does not, the claim is time-barred.106
The new laws also clarify the qualifications for expert witnesses in medical malpractice suits.107 These qualifications are divided into three categories. In a suit against a physician, the expert on whether the defendant deviated from the standard of care must, at a minimum, (1) practice medicine at the time she testifies or have been practicing medicine at the time the claim arose; (2) have knowledge of the accepted standards of medical care for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim; and (3) be qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of medical care.108 Similar requirements apply for experts testifying in a suit against a health care provider, though the requirements account for experts who are not physicians.109 Experts who testify on causation are required to satisfy the standards of the Texas Rules of Evidence.110
Finally, the new medical malpractice laws make available an important interlocutory appeal. A party may appeal an interlocutory order denying in whole or in part the relief sought by a motion to dismiss based on a plaintiff’s failure to timely file an expert report in a medical malpractice claim.111 A party may appeal an interlocutory order granting a motion contesting the adequacy of an expert report in a medical malpractice claim.112
The provisions apply to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.113

INTEREST
The new legislation has changed certain aspects of both pre- and post-judgment interest. First, pre-judgment interest may not be awarded on future damages.114 In addition, the post-judgment interest is now based on the prime rate published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on the date of computation.115 The interest rate may not be lower than 5 percent or higher than 15 percent.116 Previously, the interest rate had a floor of 10 percent and interest was routinely awarded on that portion of the jury verdict intended to compensate for future damages. These provisions apply to all final judgments signed or subject to appeal on or after September 1, 2003.117

DAMAGES
The new legislation on damages broadens Chapter 41 to include all types of damages, not just exemplary damages. The new laws also clarify the Moriel language used in the 1995 revisions to the statutes governing punitive damages. For example, the new law resumes the use of the term “gross negligence,” whose definition is the same as that previously used for “malice.”118 In addition to defining “gross negligence,” the new law defines “compensatory damages,” “future damages,” “future loss of earnings,” “non-economic damages” and “periodic payments.”119
The new laws limit exemplary damages. To award exemplary damages, the jury’s decision as to liability and amount must be unanimous.120 To this end, the jury has to be instructed that “in order for you to find exemplary damages, your answer to the question regarding the amount of such damages must be unanimous.”121
The provisions apply to actions filed on or after September 1, 2003.122

SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN ASBESTOS ACTIONS
The legislation addressing successor liability in asbestos lawsuits now extinguishes future liability of asbestos defendants who have paid out their liability limits in previous cases. And even after the defendant reaches the limit, that defendant will be included on the jury charge as a responsible third party and reduce the liability of the party defendants without itself incurring any further monetary losses.123
As a general rule, the cumulative successor asbestos-related liabilities of a corporation are limited to the fair market value (“FMV”) of the transferor entity’s total gross assets.124 The FMV is determined at the time that the corporation merged or consolidated and entails a complicated calculation process involving annual adjustments.125 Once this limit is reached, the corporation will have no further responsibility to pay out damages in asbestos cases.126
Essentially, these provisions are de-signed to cover the chain of successor entities, starting with the initial company. The liability limit applies to a foreign or domestic company that (a) had a certificate of authority to do business or that has done business in Texas, (b) mined or sold asbestos-containing products, and (c) became a successor to asbestos liabilities through an acquisition or merger that occurred before May 13, 1968.127 However, among a sizeable list of exceptions, the limit does not apply to (1) successors that continued the predecessor’s asbestos-related business after the merger or consolidation; (2) prior settlements or arrangements made with asbestos claimants or potential claimants; (3) any claim against a debtor to a bankruptcy proceeding filed before April 1, 2003; or (4) a successor asbestos-related liability arising from a premises liability claim if the successor owned or controlled the premises after the merger or consolidation.128
These new provisions apply to actions filed on or after June 11, 2003.129 They also apply to any pending action whose trial begins on or after June 11, 2003.130

EVIDENCE
The prohibition against introducing evidence of lack of seat belt use is repealed.131 This provision applies to suits filed on or after July 1, 2003.132
In addition, findings that a licensed nursing facility has violated certain medical standards or has been assessed fines that are unrelated to the injury or damages alleged in a civil suit against the facility are not admissible.133 The new provisions apply to suits filed on or after September 1, 2003.134

Endnotes
1. Janet Elliott, Tort Reform May Extend Session, Hous. Chron., May 29, 2003, at A1. 2. Tex. H.B. 4, 78th Leg., R.S. (2003). Whenever possible, references to specific provisions of H.B. 4 will reflect the new code and section within the Texas statutes. All other references will specify sections within H.B. 4. 3. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 26.051(a). 4. Id. § 26.051(b). 5. Id. § 26.051(c). 6. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 7. Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.225(d). 8. Id. §§ 22.001(e), 22.225(e). 9. H.B. 4 at § 1.05(a). 10. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(b). 11. Id. 12. H.B. 4 at § 1.05(b). 13. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 42.002(a), (b). 14. Id. § 42.002(c); see § 42.003 (stating the requirements for a settlement offer). 15. See id. § 42.004(a). 16. Id. § 42.001(5). 17. Id. 18. Id. § 42.004(a). 19. Id. § 42.004(b)(1). 20. Id. § 42.004(b)(2). 21. Id. § 42.004(d). 22. Id. § 42.004(e), (f). 23. Id. § 42.004(g). 24. H.B. 4 at § 2.02. 25. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 15.003(a). 26. Id. 27. Id. § 15.003(a)(1) – (4). 28. Tex. Prob. Code § 5B(b). 29. Id. 30. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 31. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.051(b). 32. Id. 33. H.B. 4 at § 3.09. 34. Id. at § 23.03(a). 35. Tex. Gov’t Code § 74.024(c)(10). 36. Id. § 74.161(a). The new appointees announced July 1 are Chief Justice Scott Brister of the First Court of Appeals in Houston, Justice Errlinda Castillo of the Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi, Justice Mack Kidd of the Third Court of Appeals in Austin, Justice Douglas S. Lang of the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas, and Judge David Peeples, presiding judge of the Fourth Administrative Region in San Antonio. 37. Id. § 74.162. 38. Id. § 74.162(1), (2). 39. Id. § 74.162. 40. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 41. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.004(a). 42. Id. 43. Id. § 33.011(6). 44. Id. (striking provisions under former section 33.011(6)(B)(i), (ii)). 45. Id. (striking provisions under former section 33.011(6)(A)(i) – (iii)). 46. Id. 47. Id. § 33.004(e). 48. Id. § 33.004(l). 49. Id. 50. Id. § 33.004(i). 51. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(c). 52. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.013(b)(1). 53. H.B. 4 at § 4.10(3), (5). 54. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(c). 55. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.012(b). 56. H.B. 4 at § 4.10(4), (6). 57. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 33.012(c). 58. Id. § 33.012(d). 59. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(c). 60. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.012(a)(2), (a)(2)(E). 61. Id. § 16.012(d). 62. Id. § 16.012(d-1). 63. Id. § 16.012(g). 64. Id. § 82.003(a). 65. Id. § 82.003(a)(1) – (7). 66. Id. § 82.007(a). 67. Id. § 82.007(b). 68. Id. § 82.008(a). 69. Id. § 82.002(b)(1). 70. Id. § 82.002(b)(2). 71. Id. § 82.002(c). 72. Id. § 82.002(c)(1). 73. Id. § 82.002(c)(2). 74. Id. § 82.002(d). 75. Id. § 82.002(e). 76. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(c). 77. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 35.006(a). 78. Id. § 35.006(b). 79. H.B. 4 at §§ 7.04(b), 23.02(a). 80. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 52.006(a). 81. Id. § 52.006(b). 82. Id. § 52.006(c). 83. Id. § 52.006(d). 84. H.B. 4 at §§ 7.04(a), 23.02(a). 85. H.B. 4 at §§ 10.01, 10.09. 86. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 74.301(a). 87. Id. § 74.301(b). 88. Id. § 74.301(c). 89. Id. § 74.302(b). 90. Id. § 74.302(b)(1). 91. Id. § 74.302(b)(2). 92. Id. § 74.302(b)(3). 93. Id. § 74.302(b); H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 94. Id. § 74.302(c)(2), (3). 95. Id. § 74.302(d)(2), (3). 96. Id. § 74.302(c)(1), (d)(1). 97. Id. § 74.303(a), (c). 98. Id. § 74.303(b). 99. Id. § 74.502. 100. Id. §§ 74.503(b), 74.505(a), (b). 101. Id. § 74.503(c), (d). 102. Id. § 74.251(a). 103. Id. 104. Id. § 74.251(b). 105. Id. 106. Id. 107. Id. § 74.401(a) – (c). 108. Id. § 74.401(a)(1) – (3). 109. Id. § 74.402(b)(1) – (3). 110. Id. § 74.403(a). 111. Id. § 51.014(a)(9). 112. Id. § 51.014(a)(10). 113. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 114. Tex. Fin. Code § 304.1045. 115. Id. § 304.003(c)(1). 116. Id. § 304.003(c)(2), (c)(3). 117. H.B. 4 at § 6.04. 118. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 41.001(11). 119. Id. § 41.001(8), (9), (10), (12), (13). 120. Id. § 41.003(d). 121. Id. § 41.003(e). 122. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a). 123. See notes 41-50, supra. 124. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 149.003(a). 125. Id. §§ 149.003(b), 149.004, 149.005. 126. Id. § 149.003(a). 127. Id. § 149.002(a). 128. Id. § 149.002(b)(5) – (8). 129. H.B. 4 at §§ 17.02(a), 23.02(b). 130. H.B. 4 at § 17.02(b). 131. H.B. 4 at § 8.01 (repealing sections 545.412(d) and 545.413(g) of the Texas Transportation Code). 132. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(c). 133. Tex. Hum. Res. Code § 32.060(a); Tex. Health & Safety Code 242.017(a). 134. H.B. 4 at § 23.02(a).

Patrice Pujol is a litigation and appellate attorney with Spain Hastings Willingham Beason and Ward. She earned her J.D. from South Texas College of Law in 1995. She is the articles editor for The Houston Lawyer.

Marty Thompson is a business and environmental litigation attorney in the Houston office of Haynes and Boone, LLP. Thompson earned her J.D. from The University of Texas School of Law in 2002. In 1999, Thompson graduated magna cum laude from the University of St. Thomas in Houston.

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