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November/December 2006

The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine
and Its Effect on Employee Mobility


By Gregory Porter and Joseph Beauchamp

Introduction
A
n engineer working in the oil field services industry figures her decision to accept employment with a prospective competitor of a prior employer is a harmless one, as millions of Americans change jobs in the post-dot-com economy. The engineer, who never signed a non-competition agreement with her prior employer, reasons that there is no prohibition against her working for a competitor, certainly not in the U.S., which values labor mobility. The engineer fails to realize that her prior employer may use the law of inevitable disclosure (perhaps in conjunction with a confidentiality agreement signed years earlier) in an effort to prevent the engineer from working for a competitor.

In a resulting lawsuit, the prior employer argues that the engineer could not use her job experience for a competitor, as her knowledge is allegedly tainted with an assortment of its confidential information and trade secrets, which she inevitably would use while working for a competitor. The prior employer thus argues that such employment should be enjoined by a court. The engineer contends that the research and development she had performed years earlier relates to technology that is generally available and, in any event, that she cannot recall any information specific enough to use. She reasons that any employee should be allowed to change jobs and use her basic skills and knowledge.

Of course this situation also affects the engineer’s prospective employer, which feels that it has the right to hire the engineer and is not attempting to misappropriate trade secrets. However, the prospective employer also has to weigh whether retaining the engineer is worth the price of being embroiled in a lawsuit.

The foregoing situation is not unique to engineers, nor is it unique to a particular state. Instead, in a tightening skilled-labor market, it is becoming more common throughout the country as employers seek to retain at-will employees who have not signed a covenant not to compete. Accordingly, any company with a research and development, manufacturing or sales facility should be aware of and actively address the issue of trade secrets with respect to prospective and departing employees.

While the aforementioned issues often arise in a non-compete agreement case, application of the inevitable disclosure doctrine may effectively create a non-competition obligation where no such agreement was negotiated. Conversely, lack of application of the doctrine could invite the loss of valuable trade secrets. As a result of these inherent tensions, state and federal courts across the U.S. constantly struggle to weigh employee rights against those of trade secret owners even outside the context of non-competition agreements. This changing landscape, multiplied by the number of different jurisdictions, multiplied by the infinite number of specific fact patterns, requires lawyers to tackle difficult challenges in an inevitable disclosure case.

 

Inevitable Disclosure Basics
In its most basic form, the doctrine of inevitable disclosure allows courts to prohibit an employee from working for a competitor of his former employer if the employee could not help but use or disclose the former employer’s trade secrets in carrying out his new job. Most courts require that the former employer show, at a minimum:

  1. that trade secrets exist,
  2. that the employee had access to them, and
  3. that the trade secrets would be inevitably used.1

The doctrine of inevitable disclosure has most often appeared in decisions under state statutes incorporating the Uniform Trade Secret Act (“UTSA”) which allows “threatened” misappropriation to be enjoined.2 At last count, 45 states have adopted some form of the UTSA, but, not all of those states have interpreted “threatened” misappropriation as acceptance of the inevitable disclosure doctrine. In fact, California courts expressly have rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine “as contrary to California law and public policy because it creates an after-the-fact covenant not to compete, restricting employee mobility.”3

Despite the opportunity, Texas courts have not officially recognized the inevitable disclosure doctrine.4 However, courts applying Texas law have arguably adopted some form of the doctrine.5 For example, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law to a claim of trade secrets misappropriation, entered a preliminary injunction that prevented a former employee from divulging any trade secrets to his new employer. 6 The court specifically enjoined the new employer from putting the employee “in a position that poses an inherent threat of disclosure or use of [the former employer’s] trade secrets.”7 The Fifth Circuit noted that “[e]ven assuming the best of good faith, [the former employee] will have difficulty preventing his knowledge of FMC’s [proprietary] manufacturing techniques from infiltrating his work.”8 Similarly, a Texas appellate court entered a temporary injunction preventing an employee from performing any duties for his new employer that were similar to the duties performed for his prior employer based on the risk of disclosure of trade secrets.9 While neither court referenced the inevitable disclosure doctrine by name, both courts arguably were applying some version of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.

A leading case on inevitable disclosure and one of the first in which a circuit court upheld an injunction is Pepsico v. Redmond.10 In that case, a general manager of Pepsi accepted a job in Quaker’s sports drink division to execute its sports drink marketing plans. The general manager had worked at Pepsi for ten years, had signed a confidentiality agreement, and had access to Pepsi’s confidential plans for increasing its market share in sports drinks. The Court prevented the manager from taking the Quaker job for six months on the grounds that the proposed employment would inevitably lead the manager to disclose trade secrets of his former employer and make decisions for his new employer based on those trade secrets.11 The Court said that Pepsi “finds itself in the position of a coach, one of whose players has left, playbook in hand, to join the opposing team before the big game.”12

 

How Long After an Employee Leaves Can the Doctrine be Applied?
Even if a state has accepted the inevitable disclosure doctrine, under what circumstances should it be applied? In the Pepsico case above, Pepsi’s employee was moving immediately from Pepsi to a competitor. What happens if an employee first moves to a non-competitor and later joins a competitor of her former employer? How long is an employee subject to the risk of being prevented from working for a competitor?

In a recent trade secret trial, a federal court declined to apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine in the circumstance of a scientist who had left his prior employer four years before joining a direct competitor. However, in other circumstances, courts have applied the inevitable disclosure doctrine over a year after the employee had left his prior employment.13 In reviewing the cases from jurisdictions that follow the doctrine, it is apparent that there is no bright line rule. Instead, courts consider several issues that seem to be important as courts wrestle with whether to apply the doctrine.

First, courts consider the technology involved. The more rapid the technology-at-issue evolves, the less willing a court is to apply the doctrine after a passage of time.14 The rationale apparently is that if technology is advancing rapidly, then over time an employee’s prior knowledge is less relevant, any remaining trade secrets are less valuable, and the employee’s rights should trump the trade secret owner’s rights. Conversely, when the technology is less progressive, then the inevitable disclosure doctrine is more likely to be applied to prevent an employee from competing.15

A second factor to predict the applicability of the doctrine is the nature of the trade secrets and the extent of the employee’s exposure to those trade secrets.16 A court may determine whether the employee who has been removed from the industry for a period of time will remember the alleged trade secrets in sufficient detail and if so, whether the employee can separate her general industry knowledge from her knowledge of the trade secrets.17 If the nature of the trade secrets is such that they are easy to remember and the employee had daily access to them for a number of years, then the doctrine is more likely to apply. Conversely, if the alleged trade secrets are more complex (such as comprehensive financial data or a complicated chemical formula involving specific amounts of a large number of ingredients), then the doctrine may be less likely to apply.18 This is especially true if the employee had only brief exposure to the trade secret.

Of course, a host of other factors appear when examining whether the doctrine applies to an employee who does not immediately join a competitor. For example, a court may review the efforts of the new employer to prevent inadvertently obtaining the trade secrets, or may consider the credibility of the employee.19 Generally, the doctrine is more likely to be applied when there are no steps taken by the new employer or if there is a lack of truthfulness by the employee in regard to the scope of employment or exposure to the alleged trade secrets.20

 

Application Outside the Injunction Context
In a typical case like Pepsico, the doctrine is used to seek an injunction. However, because the law of inevitable disclosure varies so much by jurisdiction and by fact scenario, lawyers have attempted to use it, to varying degrees of success, outside the injunction context. Among the more successful uses have been by trade secret owners facing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or summary judgment of no misappropriation.21 Here, even though there may be no basis for an actual misappropriation claim, the inevitable disclosure doctrine may operate to support threatened trade secret misappropriation.

There is not a lot of published information about the use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in the context of a trial. However, based on personal experience and anecdotal information, use of the inevitable disclosure doctrine at trial is not generally accepted. For example, trade secret owners’ request for the inclusion of inevitable disclosure in the jury instructions in lieu of or in addition to actual misappropriation has been denied. Similarly, when a competing product has been developed by the former employee and his new employer, trade secret owners have tried unsuccessfully to use the doctrine to obtain an inference that the product was not developed independently. The rationale for disregarding the doctrine in these circumstances is that the doctrine’s applicability is a matter of law, and applying it at trial would allow the trade secret holder to prevail without presenting evidence of actual use of the trade secret. Of course, as there is not an absolute prohibition against use of the doctrine at trial, it is possible that some circumstances may justify its application.

 

Conclusion
Applying the doctrine of the inevitable disclosure is fraught with uncertainties, including what state law governs, how long after the employee has left is it applicable, and in what context can it be used. Accordingly, to achieve additional certainty, a trade secret owner may wish to negotiate a non-compete agreement22 with employees who will be exposed to its trade secrets. Although non-compete agreements also come with uncertainties, a clause as to the governing state law and knowledge of that state’s non-compete law should provide more certainty for employers and employees alike. Similarly, a company hiring a new employee should obtain his or her commitment not to use or disclose confidential information of any third party. While not determinative, such a commitment should help in fighting a charge of inevitable disclosure.

Gregory Porter and Joseph Beauchamp are attorneys at the Houston office of Jones Day, specializing in patent and trade secret litigation. Porter has acted as lead counsel in trade secret cases in both state and federal court.


Endnotes
1.Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1269 (7th Cir. 1995).   2.See, e.g., Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 2(a) (“Actual or threatened misappropriation may be enjoined.”).   3.Schlage Lock Company v. Whyte, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277 (2002).   4.See Cardinal Health Staffing Network v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 242 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ).   5.See id.  See also Bertotti v. C.E. Shepherd Co., 752 S.W.2d 648, 653 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); Rugen v. Interactive Business Systems, Inc., 864 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. App.—Dallas [5th Dist.] 1993, no writ).   6.FMC Corp. v. Varco Int’l Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 505 (5th Cir. 1982).   7.Id.   8.Id. at 504.   9.Weed Eater, Inc. v. Dowling,  562 S.W.2d 898, 902 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).   10.Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).   11.Id. at 1269.   12.Id. at 1270.   13.Cacique, Inc. v. V&V Supreme Foods, Inc., 2004 WL 2222270, *15-*16 Id. at 1269 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2004).   14.See Lexis-Nexis v. Beer, 41 F.Supp.2d 950, 958 (D. Minn. 1999).   15.See id.   16.See Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Lockhart, 5 F.Supp.2d 667, 682 (S.D. Ind. 1998).   17.See id.   18.See id.   19.Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1270-71 (7th Cir. 1995).   20.See id.   21.See, e.g., Automated Techs., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F.Supp.2d 915, 921 (N.D. Ill. 2001); PRG-Schultz Int’l, Inc. v. Kirix Corp., 2003 WL 22232771 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 22, 2003).   22. Practitioners should be aware of the recent non-compete case Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Kenneth Johnson and Strunk & Assocs., L.P., No. 03-1050, 2006 WL 2997287, at *1 (Tex. October 20, 2006)(holding that an at-will employee’s non-compete covenant becomes enforceable when the employer performs the promises it made in exchange for the covenant).

 


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